The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Requiem by Carol Wise
CESifo Forum 4/2010 3
Focus
THE NORTH AMERICAN
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Despite the emphasis that then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama placed on the need to renegotiate the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
during his 2008 US presidential campaign, this
promise has thus far come to naught. Once elected,
President Obama’s first foreign visit was to Mexico to
confer with President Felipe Calderón. During this
diplomatic foray Obama assured Calderón that the
United States mainly intended to upgrade those parts
of NAFTA that were of most concern to US voters,
namely, labor standards and environmental protec-
tion. Yet, when the ‘Three Amigos’ met for their first
NAFTA summit in 2009, the agenda discussed by
Obama, Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper was dominated by the problem of
undocumented migration of Mexican workers into
the United States and Canada and by the explosion of
drug trafficking and cartel-related violence along the
US-Mexico border.
As palpable as the domestic debate over the need for
NAFTA reform may have seemed at the time of the
2008 US presidential election, the fact is that NAFTA
is more or less beside the point at this political eco-
nomic juncture. This is because 99 percent of all tar-
iffs on those goods and services covered by NAFTA
have basically been eliminated, and because politi-
cians and policy makers in all three of the member
countries have failed to institutionalize and update
the agreement in ways that address problems that are
multiplier effects of NAFTA itself. At the top of this
list – apart from the easy flow of drugs and undocu-
mented migrants across the border – would be the
failure to promote export competitiveness and to fos-
ter the development of NAFTA as a regional project
proper. With NAFTA now fully implemented, the
inability of political leaders in North America to ren-
ovate and expand on the accord has meant its eclipse
by more compelling global forces. 
The most remarkable force is the rapidity with which
China has gained a foothold in sectors once consid-
ered ‘North American’, such as computer peripherals,
sound and television equipment, telecoms, electrical
machinery, equipment and parts. Since China’s 2001
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) its
exports have steadily surpassed those of Mexico and
Canada in any number of US market niches. What’s
more, US exports, mainly in auto parts and produc-
tion, are quietly being displaced by Chinese investors
in Mexico’s northern export processing, or maquila,
zones. Canada and Mexico remain the most impor-
tant trading partners of the United States overall, and
together represent the largest supply of US energy
imports; however, when it comes to remedies for
today’s economic pain, China, it seems, should be the
main departure point for any debate over the current
sources of job dislocation and associated economic
stress in the United States and larger North American
market. 
Economic policy and public discourse across North
America has yet to register the full implications of
China’s rapid ascendance in regional markets. Even
though the prospect of the ‘China threat’has spawned
a whole cottage industry of academic and popular
books in the West, apart from launching a series of
elite diplomatic dialogues and pressuring the Chinese
to revalue their currency, Washington, Ottawa and
Mexico City have been slow to react. 
Nevertheless, although competition from China may
be the most obvious factor in accounting for height-
ened job insecurity in both the United States and
Mexico, NAFTA still bears its own share of the pub-
lic’s wrath. Despite NAFTA’s considerable break-
throughs, the North American project has been
stymied by continued political gridlock over trade
policy in the United States, as well as some bitter dis-
appointments over expectations versus actual out-
comes with regard to labor and the environment.
NAFTA may still carry symbolic weight for the US
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* University of Southern California, Los Angeles.electorate, but at this point it seems safe to say that the
agreement has been steadily relegated to history’s
junk heap. 
NAFTA: from glitz to gloom 
It is now twenty years since former Mexican trade
minister Jaime Serra Puche and US Trade
Representative Carla Hills sat down at the annual
Davos Forum to explore the possibilities for negotiat-
ing what would later become the North American
Free Trade Agreement. The Uruguay Round was in
limbo at the time and the decision of the US to nego-
tiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that
included a developing country was unprecedented.
But this is just one way in which NAFTA broke new
ground.
A second benchmark for NAFTA was Mexico’s will-
ingness to forgo any special or different treatment
related to its developing country status at the NAFTA
negotiating table. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent
to which this stance represented a complete U-turn in
Mexico’s approach to foreign economic policy. The
decision marked the advent of a new generation of
more technocratic policy makers within the upper
echelons of the state bureaucracy and the eagerness of
this market-oriented cohort to lock in an entirely new
set of policies based on liberalization, privatization,
and deregulation.
This paved the way for a final agreement that went
well beyond what had been accomplished to date
within the Uruguay Round. On this count, NAFTA’s
key innovations were the protection of intellectual
property rights (IPRs), the liberalization of invest-
ment and trade in services, and the creation of mech-
anisms to resolve investment disputes based on bind-
ing international arbitration. For the first time, ‘old’
issues on the multilateral trade agenda (market access
for agricultural and industrial goods) were combined
in one agreement with the kinds of ‘new’ issues (ser-
vices, investment and IPRs) that the OECD countries
had been pushing for at least since the Tokyo Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
The fourth breakthrough was the negotiation and
attachment of labor and environmental side accords
to the NAFTA agreement, as the prospect of
Mexico’s entry into an FTA with the United States
and Canada had invoked valid worries about environ-
mental dumping and the abuse of labor rights in these
latter countries. Historical in their own right, these
labor and environmental agreements were offered up
by the Clinton administration as side payments to
garner congressional votes for NAFTA and to
counter the political blowback on the domestic front
that had arisen with regard to the steep asymmetries
between Mexico and the United States. 
Along with the side agreements on labor standards
and environmental protection, the NAFTA accord
promoted the free flow of goods, investment, and ser-
vices within the North American bloc over a 15-year
timeline that ended in 2009. Tariffs and non-tariff
barriers were eliminated on 65 percent of North
American goods by the 5-year point; tariff reductions
on automobiles occurred over a 10-year period, with
the rules-of-origin stipulation that such vehicles must
meet a 62.5 percent local-content requirement in
order to qualify.1 In the agricultural sector, sensitive
products were allotted a 15-year liberalization sched-
ule that ended in 2009. 
In the end, negotiating tensions were such that sugar
and dairy products were excluded altogether in trade
between Canada and Mexico. This is just one way in
which NAFTA still fell short of its mandate to liber-
alize substantially all trade between the three part-
ners. First, administered protection persisted in the
setting of hefty percentages for local content under
NAFTA’s rules of origin in such sectors as autos,
high-tech products and textiles and apparel. Second,
little progress was made toward the elimination of
antidumping practices and countervailing duties.
Despite the ability of special interests to secure these
protectionist concessions, hindsight suggests that
NAFTA has been a liberalizing force overall, as each
participant was clearly looking to reduce transaction
costs while simultaneously increasing the benefits of
cooperation. 
Canada and Mexico saw an opportunity to secure
access to the US market and establish clearly defined
rules and procedures for resolving trade and invest-
ment disputes. The United States, while also con-
cerned with promoting and rationalizing economic
ties within the North American bloc, primarily sought
to bolster the rules and norms that constituted the
international trade regime codified within the GATT.
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Although pragmatic in the sense that all three parties
sought to strengthen and institutionalize respective
political-economic ties that had long been in place but
had heretofore been managed in an ad hoc manner,
hindsight shows that NAFTA also unexpectedly
unleashed its own share of animal spirits in North
America. 
From the launching of the negotiations in September
1991 to the ratification vote in the US House of
Representatives in November 1993, the tone of the
NAFTA debate was counter-intuitive. Economic inte-
gration theory suggests that both the United States
and Canada, as larger, wealthier and more open G8
economies, should anticipate that marginal adjust-
ments would occur. In turn, Mexico, as the smaller,
poorer and more closed economy, should expect to
undergo a more costly adjustment in the short term,
but to realize considerable dynamic gains in the medi-
um to long term.
From this theory it should follow that the debate over
whether to pursue an FTA would be more heated in
Mexico, the country that had the most at stake.
Conversely, given that the United States and Canada
had much less on the line, one would expect a fairly
tame discussion about whether to negotiate an FTA
that included Mexico. Paradoxically, the opposite sce-
nario emerged. 
In Mexico, the administration of Carlos Salinas
(1988–1994), which oversaw the NAFTA negotia-
tions, was able to quell open debate over NAFTA by
drawing on the authoritarian clout of its ruling
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) to reinforce
informational asymmetries and marginalize dis-
senters. In Canada and the United States, the
NAFTA debate literally exploded. In the United
States, in particular, a full-scale national controversy
ensued, a main upshot being the emergence of a blue-
green coalition of grassroots labor and environmen-
tal activists that managed to insert non-trade issues
onto the US trade policy-making agenda like never
before. 
First was a realistic reaction to the miserable work-
ing conditions and badly polluted maquila factory
sites that lined the US-Mexico border. If NAFTA
signified the free flow of goods, services, and capital
between all three countries, what was to stop the
flow northward of environmental pollution and
sub-standard working conditions? To the chagrin of
free trade purists like Jagdish Bhagwati,2 it was this
coalition that compelled the senior Bush adminis-
tration to expend political capital on border cleanup
and the enforcement of much higher environmental
standards. With the election of President Bill
Clinton in 1992, the formal negotiation of labor and
environmental side agreements to accompany
NAFTA was offered as a quid pro quo for the blue-
green endorsement of the 1993 NAFTA-implement-
ing legislation. 
The second reaction was largely symbolic, whereby
NAFTA came to embody all that was cumulatively
wrong with the US political economy at the outset of
the 1990s. What had started out as an issue-oriented
blue-green coalition in 1991 blossomed into a full-
blown anti-NAFTA movement that included every-
one from job-seeking college graduates to downsized
business executives, laid-off factory workers to teach-
ers’ unions. Regardless of the actual effect that
NAFTA would have on any of these constituents,
they were united in the perception that they had some-
how been excluded from the prosperity that surround-
ed them in the late twentieth century, and they were
understandably angry about it. 
NAFTA’s self-appointed ‘losers’ have thus kept the
opposition to further trade pacts alive, as witnessed in
the paper thin margins by which subsequent US bilat-
eral FTAs have been ratified by the US Congress,
including the 2006 US-Central America FTA. But
beyond this phenomenon of NAFTA coming to sym-
bolize a general sense of downward mobility in the
United States, it is the tenacity of the blue-green coali-
tion and its effect on congressional deliberations that
perhaps best accounts for the testiness of US trade
policy since the launching of NAFTA.
Although this coalition won the battle in securing the
attachment of labor and environmental side agree-
ments to NAFTA, the lackluster enforcement of
those agreements has further prolonged the trade pol-
icy war on the domestic side. During the entire Bush
administration in the 2000s, for example, just two
labor complaints against Mexico were accepted for
review, whereas on the environmental side just seven
cases involving Mexico have been resolved over the
life time of the agreement. Thus, much of the fight
has centered on correcting the institutional weakness-
es in those earlier agreements, namely, the obligation
of each country to enforce its own existing national
laws but with little regard for strengthening and har-
2 See Bhagwati (2008).monizing North American labor and environmental
standards overall. 
The blue-green opposition has continued its demands
for more binding commitments in enforcing labor and
environmental standards. Hence, the US insistence on
incorporating labor and environmental stipulations
into the pending Doha agreement, as well as the sub-
sequent FTAs signed in the 2000s. Even seemingly
easy US bilateral talks with countries that are other-
wise ready and willing to constructively adhere to the
full menu of blue-green demands (South Korea,
Panama, Colombia) have proved to be quite cumber-
some. 
NAFTA’s uneven returns
NAFTA’s critics have arguably done a better job of
advertising its failures than its proponents have done
in touting the concrete gains that have underpinned
North American integration since the early 1990s. At
least at the aggregate level, it would be difficult to
paint NAFTA as anything but a success. This is espe-
cially so when NAFTA is judged according to its own
goals: the creation of a free trade area in which all
three partners have pursued an economic growth
strategy via the liberalization of goods, capital, and
services amongst themselves. 
Total NAFTA trade now accounts for some 30 per-
cent of all US trade,3 and the number of jobs gained
in the US economy since NAFTA’s implementation in
1994 more than compensates for those jobs lost – even
when considering the massive job losses that have
occurred in the wake of the 2007–2009 US financial
crisis. US trade in goods and services with Canada
and Mexico tripled – from 341 billion US dollars in
1993 to more than 1 trillion US dollars in 2007 – and
inward foreign direct investment quintupled among
the three countries and increased tenfold in Mexico
between 1990 and 2005 (Pastor 2008). In terms of
gross product, the NAFTA zone has now surpassed
the European Union (EU); however, the impacts of
regional integration in North America have been
quite uneven. 
Again, when viewed from the dictates of economic
integration theory, it was expected that NAFTA
would benefit all three countries, but especially
Mexico, through the deepening of already strong ties
in cross-border production and intra-industry trade.
First, the elimination of barriers at the border would
promote scale economies related to greater specializa-
tion, increased technological capabilities, and more
rapid and efficient deployment of those factors for
which Mexico has a comparative advantage (natural
resources and comparatively cheap labor).
Second, it was argued that the blending of Mexico’s
abundant factors with the capital, technology, and
know-how that Canada and the United States
brought to the table would trigger a dynamic pattern
of income convergence among the three members.
According to this largely neoclassical trade narrative,
Mexico would readily advance up the industrial and
technological learning curve, substantially increase its
per capita income, and more authentically approxi-
mate the economic indicators of its fellow OECD
members.
The data show that NAFTA has delivered rather
erratically on these expectations. At the macroeco-
nomic level, Canada and Mexico have clearly con-
verged toward the more highly developed US stan-
dard in terms of aggregate growth, interest rates,
exchange rate stability and the lowering of inflation to
under five percent annually. But the microeconomic
data tell a different story, which highlights the need
for sound domestic policy reforms to complement and
maximize on the opportunities intrinsic to a regional
integration scheme. 
After rebounding from the disastrous 1994 peso crisis,
the growth of per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) in Mexico has hit a virtual standstill in the
2000s and is still 6.3 times lower than that of the
United States. Even Canada, despite its advantage as
a G8 country, has lagged in this regard. Although
Canadian income distribution is the most equitable in
North America, Canada’s per capita income remains
about 20 percent lower than that of the United States
and its productivity and investment ratios are similar-
ly trailing. 
While the roots of microeconomic under-perfor-
mance appear to lie somewhere in the gulf between
neoclassical trade theory – which assumes a state of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale
under NAFTA – and the concrete empirical obstacles
that underpinned its launching back in the early
1990s, the persistent divergence between the United
States and its NAFTA partners can also be chalked
up to the nature of political institutions and policy
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making in these countries. In short, both Canada and
Mexico, albeit in greatly varying degrees, are still in
need of more proactive competition policies that spur
rather than deter investments, increase ties between
research and development (R&D), universities and
private initiative, and promote the application of
advanced technology to the extraction of natural
resources and the production of goods.
NAFTA’s potential here is limited, as it has delivered
its punch in terms of the role that enhanced levels of
trade and investment can play in catalyzing further
microeconomic change for both Canada and Mexico.
Because of the minimalist institutional framework
that all three members agreed to at the outset,
NAFTA has basically been frozen in place and is sore-
ly out of date when it comes to tackling today’s micro-
economic challenges. 
The twilight of North American integration 
The importance of Canada and Mexico as US trade
and investment partners is indisputable, and the
impressive growth of North American gross product
is testimony to the depth of these ties. At this point,
however, NAFTA’s operational tendencies are still
more akin to two bilateral deals that have basically
been cobbled together, meaning that the whole is no
greater that the sum of its parts. Whereas the very cre-
ation of NAFTA is testimony to the possibilities of
trilateral coordination based on the national interests
of each trade partner, all three countries adamantly
resisted the option of strengthening this cooperation
via the creation of European Union (EU)-style supra-
national institutions. 
Canada and Mexico opposed the institutional for-
malization of NAFTA on the grounds that they
would be pushed around and further disempowered
by the United States if North America were to take
the supranational institutional route. The United
States reacted in its typical Anglo-Saxon fashion,
pejoratively equating the creation of supranational
institutions with the proliferation of the ‘Brussels
bureaucracy’ in North America. This insistence
that NAFTA remain a free trade area in the absence
of sound institutional moorings has thus stunted its
evolution into a more compelling regional project.
Case in point: the growth in total NAFTA trade in
the 2000s has been about 3 percent, versus the
9.8 percent growth rate registered in 1994–2000
(Pastor 2008).
In light of this impasse, it seems safe to say that the
authentic revival of NAFTA as a regional project
would require that the United States, as the hegemon-
ic member and industrial anchor, step forward with
the necessary leadership and provision of public
goods. Yet, the most visible US commitment in the
Bush junior era was the construction of a double-lay-
ered wall and hundreds of miles of vehicle barriers
along the 1,933-mile US-Mexico border meant to halt
the northward flow of undocumented workers.
Mandated by the Secure Fence Act of 2006 in the
wake of failed efforts within the US Congress to reach
bipartisan agreement on any number of sticking
points in the proposed immigration legislation, the
US Department of Homeland Security expects to
complete this project by 2011 at a cost of 7.6 billion
US dollars. Rather than investing in badly needed
improvements in the highway infrastructure that links
the three countries, this hefty US financial commit-
ment to construct further border barriers has under-
standably enraged its NAFTA partners. 
A final wedge is China, now a major trade and invest-
ment presence throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Whereas China’s trade relationship with South
America is based on more traditional patterns of
comparative advantage – China’s export of lower-end
industrial goods and its import of primary products
from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, in particular
– the China-NAFTA relationship is one of export
similarity and fierce competition for manufacturing
market share, especially with regard to Mexico and
the United States (Devlin 2008).
Between 2002 and 2008, Mexico’s share of the US
import market slipped by 11 percent, from 11.6 to
10.3 percent, while China’s share rose by 50 percent,
from 10.8 percent to 16.2 percent (Watkins 2009).
Given that nearly all of Mexico’s manufactured exports
to the United States are goods produced by companies
that operate under the maquila (two-thirds of manu-
factured exports) or Pitex (one-third of manufactured
exports) programs, i.e. programs that were specifically
designed to deepen US-Mexican integration in these
sectors, it is incumbent upon both sides in this partner-
ship to work jointly to combat these intense competi-
tive challenges from China. Remarkably, US and
Mexican leaders in the public and private sector have
been completely passive on this count.
Along with China’s outpacing of all other developing
countries in its growth of manufactured exports from
2000–2006, it is now increasing its competitiveness inhigh technology exports at an even greater speed than
in manufacturing as a whole (Gallagher and
Porzecanski 2010). Although Mexico is the only Latin
American country to rank amongst the top twenty
developing countries in terms of the technological
content of its manufactured exports, Kevin Gallagher
and others report that as of 2006, 82 percent of
Mexican exports in this category were under some
degree of competitive threat from China (Gallagher
and Porzecanski 2010).
The irony in Mexico’s case is that the stated purpose
of the country’s 1994 entry into NAFTA was precise-
ly to advance steadily up the industrial learning curve
and to situate domestic producers more securely on
the technological frontier. What went wrong? Prior to
entering NAFTA, trade and investment were liberal-
ized and longstanding industrial policies were dis-
mantled. Under NAFTA, the innovation process,
including technology transfer and R&D, was relegat-
ed to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico’s
assembly plants, and it was envisioned that innova-
tion would result from the dynamic spillovers and
multiplier effects of heightened trade and investment
flows. However, sixteen years later, expenditures on
R&D have actually declined since 1994, and under
the prevailing laissez-faire regime the country’s
Information Technology (IT) sector and firms have
been decimated. 
With US policy makers fixated on the completion of a
highly symbolic wall along the Mexican border, and
US public opinion holding on to its longstanding
NAFTA grudge, Chinese investors are also quietly
staking out their claims in the Mexican market. The
overriding goal is to establish manufacturing opera-
tions in Mexico based on integrated global production
chains, with an eye toward exporting to the US market. 
For example, while still an incipient trend, the Chinese
computer company Lenovo is establishing supply
facilities in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua,
the Golden Dragon firm is constructing a plant to
produce copper tubes in the state of Coahuila and, in
the Mexican state of Hidalgo, China’s Giant Engine
Company has invested 50 million US dollars to
acquire an auto assembly plant (Ellis 2009). Through
joint partnerships with companies such as Mexico’s
Grupo Elektra, a major distributor and financier of
infrastructure, Chinese automakers like Zhongxing,
the First Automobile Works, and others have set their
sights on jointly producing some 1.6 million cars per
year in Mexico by 2012. 
Thus, the United States could soon be facing the
worst-case scenario of all with regard to its mam-
moth commercial deficit: the displacement of US
suppliers by Chinese firms in Mexico’s maquila
assembly plants – a trend that is now underway – and
China’s ability to offset Mexico’s higher labor and
production costs by meeting NAFTA’s regional con-
tent requirements and thereby gaining duty-free
access to the US market. 
Needless to say, this is a far cry from what NAFTA’s
architects originally had in mind. Unhappily, the
daunting domestic and regional repercussions of the
2007–2009 financial meltdown in the United States,
combined with President Obama’s considerable losses
in the US 2010 mid-term elections, do not bode well
for policy innovation vis-a-vis NAFTA. As Canada
looks once again to the EU for answers and Mexico
retreats into a survival-oriented mode, it seems safe to
say that North America has officially entered the
post-NAFTA era. 
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